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COMMENTS 
TAXATION - FEDERAL INCOME TAX- CORPORATE AccuMULA-
TIONS, STOCK DIVIDENDS AND THE "PREFERRED STOCK BAIL-OUT," AND 
TAXABILITY OF THE CORPORATION UPON THE DISTRIBUTION OF "IN-
VENTORY AssETs" UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CoDE OF 1954-
In enacting the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Congress left substan-
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tially unchanged many areas of existing law, made extensive changes 
in other areas, and incorporated into the statute a number of provisions 
which had never before appeared. Some of the most extensive changes 
in existing law occurred in the area of corporate accumulations and 
distributions. 
The Senate Finance Committee was in full agreement with the 
House Ways and Means Committee as to the basic objectives to be 
accomplished by the enactment of the 1954 code: 
"(l) ... To make existing law more certain by redrafting 
existing provisions so as to clarify their meaning and by supplying 
statutory provisions where none now exist .... 
"(3) To make impossible a number of tax ~voidance devices 
which exist under the present statute and have received the sanc-
tion of court decisions."1 
An inspection of these provisions in the new code which bear on cor-
porate accumulations and distributions makes it clear that Congress 
has, in many respects, accomplished its basic objectives with regard 
thereto. It is also clear, however, that Congress not only has failed to 
resolve many of the interpretative difficulties existing under the Internal 
Revenue .Code of 1939, but, in addition, has created new ones. It is 
the purpose of this discussion to indicate, with respect to corporate 
accumulations and distributions, some of the major interpretative 
problems existing under the 1939 code which Congress has failed to 
resolve, as well as some of the major interpretative difficulties which 
arise for the first time under the 1954 code. 
I. _ Corporate Accumulations 
Section 102 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 imposed a pen-
alty surtax upon the "undistributed Section 102 net income" of any 
corporation "formed or availed of for the purpose of preventing the 
imposition of the surtax upon its shareholders or the shareholders of 
any other corporation, through the medium of permitting earnings or 
profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed."2 The 
statute further provided that if earnings or profits were permitted to 
accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business, this fact 
would be considered determinative of the purpose to avoid the tax 
1 H. Rep. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d sess., part I, p. 34 (1954); S. Rep. 1622, 83d Cong., 
2d sess., part I, p. 41 (1954). 
21.R.C. (1939), §102(a). 
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unless the corporation proved otherwise by the clear preponderance of 
the evidence.8 
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 has made two important 
changes in the prior law under section 102, I.RC. (1939), both of 
which raise interpretative problems. These changes relate to (1) the 
burden of proof and (2) the meaning of the phrase "reasonable needs 
of the business." 
In respect to the changes made in the 1954 code regarding the 
burden of proof, several interpretative difficulties may arise. Under 
the 1939 code, the fact that earnings or profits were permitted to accu-
mulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business was determinative 
of the purpose to avoid the surtax upon the shareholders unless the 
corporation, ''by the clear preponderance of the evidence," should 
prove to the contrary.4 Under the 1954 code, such fact is determinative 
of the purpose to avoid the surtax unless the corporation, "by the pre-
ponderance of the evidence," should prove to the contrary.5 The ques-
tion immediately arises, therefore: may the taxpayer rebut the presump-: 
tion raised under the 1954 code by a lesser weight of evidence than 
was needed to rebut the presumption raised by the 1939 code? The 
omission of the word "clear" from the 1954 code might be significa11t 
in that it leaves the courts free to answer the question in the affirmative. 
A negative answer to the question is more likely, however, for as a 
practical matter courts do not appear to distinguish between "a pre-
ponderance of the evidence" and "a clear preponderance of the evi-
dence. "6 
Whereas under the 1939 code, if the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue proposed a deficiency on the ground that the taxpayer had 
accumulated earnings and profits in excess of the reasonable needs of 
the business, the taxpayer had the burden of proving the reasonable-
ness of the accumulation,7 under the 1954 code, the burden ·of proof is 
placed upon the Commissioner in certain enumerated instances.8 
Under the 1954 code, in order to shift the burden of proving the rea-
sonableness of the accumulation from the taxpayer to the Commissioner, 
one of two events must occur: the Commissioner must fail to send a 
s I.R.C. (1939), §l02(c). 
4Jbid. 
5 I.R.C. (1954), §533(a). 
6 Northwestern Electric Co. v. Federal Power Commission, (9th Cir. 1943) 134 F. 
(2d) 740; Livanovitch v. Livanovitch, 99 Vt. 327, 131 A. 799 (1926). 
7 I.R.C. (1939), §102(c). 
s I.R.C. (1954), §534. 
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notification to the taxpayer as prescribed in section 534(b),9 or the 
taxpayer must submit a "statement of the grounds (together with facts 
sufficient to show the basis thereof) on which [he] relies to establish 
that all or any part of the earnings or profits have not been permitted 
to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business."10 
In regard to the statement which may be submitted by the taxpayer, 
the question will arise as to what constitutes "facts sufficient to show 
the basis" of the grounds upon which the taxpayer relies. Two inter-
pretations of this phrase are possible: (I) conclusions of fact; (2) con-
clusions of fact supported by much of the evidentiary material required 
to substantiate such facts. It should be noted that if the latter interpre-
tation is adopted the result would be to require the taxpayer to prove 
the reasonableness of the accumulation before the Commissioner is 
required to prove the unreasonableness of the accumulation. In other 
words, adoption of the latter interpretation would nullify the efforts 
of Congress to shift the burden of proof in "accumulated earning tax" 
cases where the taxpayer elects to submit a statement under sections 
534(a)(2) and 534(c). 
The major interpretative difficulty arising under section 102 of the 
1939 code was the meaning of the phrase "reasonable needs of the busi-
ness."11 The House Ways and Means Committee, feeling that im-
proper criteria were applied in the interpretation of this phrase,12 ex-
pressly provided in the House version of the 1954 code that "reasonable 
needs of the business" shall include the "reasonably anticipated needs 
of the business."13 The Report of the Committee on Ways and Means 
indicates that the Committee felt that the new provision would elimi-
nate the test under which there must be an immediate need for the 
funds in order to justify the retention of earnings.14 The Committee 
was of the opinion that the new provision would cover the case where 
the taxpayer has specific and definite plans for the acquisition of build-
ings or equipment for use in the business, but would not apply where 
future plans are vague or indefinite, or where execution of the plans 
is postponed indefinitely.15 
Insofar as the term "reasonable needs of the business" has been 
interpreted with reference to the size of the surplus retained by the 
o I.R.C. (1954), §534(a)(l). 
l0J.R.C. (1954), §§534(a)(2) and 534(c). 
11 7 MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INco:ME TAXATION §§40.11 to 40.14 (1943). 
12H. Rep. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d sess., part I, p. 53 (1954). 
13 H.R. 8300, §533, now I.R.C. (1954), §537. 
14 H. Rep. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d sess., part I, p. 53 (1954). 
15Jbid. 
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corporation, it. would appear that Congress has accomplished its ob-
jective in amending the phrase to include "reasonably anticipated needs 
of the business." It should be noted, however, that the phrase "reason-
able needs of the business" refers to the purpose behind the accumu-
lation as well as to the size of the surplus. The factual question arising 
in this context is whether the purpose for which the surplus is accu-
mulated may reasonably be considered to be a "need" of the business. 
By changing the statutory language, Congress may be said to have done 
nothing more than to cause the question to be whether the purpose 
for which the surplus is accumulated may now, or in the anticipated 
future, reasonably be considered to be a "need" of the business. The 
interpretative difficulty involved in determining what constitutes a 
"need" remains the same under the 1954 code as under the 1939 code. 
In addition to its failure to resolve the principal interpretative diffi-
culty under section 102, I.R.C. (1939), Congress has created a new 
problem. In amending the language of the statute to read "reasonably 
anticipated needs of the business," Congress has raised the question 
of how far into the future a corporation may plan if it is to meet a 
standard of reasonable anticipation. This question necessarily is a 
factual one which must depend in each case upon the particular busi-
ness involved. It may also turn upon the vagueness or definiteness of 
the plans under consideration.16 
In fairness to Congress it must be stated that the interpretative 
difficulties raised by the word "reasonable" are impossible of resolution 
through legislative action. For reasonableness is at best an amorphous 
concept which the courts alone can delineate with clarity. 
II. Stock Dividends and the "Pref erred Stock Bail-Out" 
Two of the major problems which arose under the 1939 code with 
reference to the effect of corporate distributions upon shareholders 
involved stock dividends17 and the so-called "preferred stock bail-out." 
In enacting the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Congress has attempted 
to provide solutions to both of these problems. 
Under the 1939 code, the taxability of a particular stock dividend 
depended upon whether the distribution constituted income to the share-
holder within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to the United 
16 Ibid. 
17 Distributions by a corporation to its shareholders of its stock or of rights to acquire 
its stock. 
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States Constitution.18 If so, the distribution was taxable.19 The enact-
ment by Congress of the 1954 code has solved this problem by provid-
ing that, with certain exceptions, " ... gross income does not include 
the amount of any distribution niade by a corporation to its sharehold-
ers, with respect to the stock of such corporation, in its stock or in rights 
to acquire its stock."20 
One of the exceptions to this rule, however, may raise a serious 
constitutional question. The 1954 code provides that a distribution by 
a corporation of its stock or of rights to acquire its stock shall be treated 
as other dividend distributions are treated " ... to the extent that the 
distribution is made in discharge of preference dividends for the taxable 
year of the corporation in which the distribution is made or for the 
preceding taxable year .... "21 
This exception to the general rule raises once more the question 
of whether the distribution constitutes income to the distributee within 
the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. On the one hand, it is 
clear that where certain types of stock dividends are distributed in dis-
charge of preference dividends, e.g., distribution of common stock to 
preferred shareholders, they would not be exempt from taxation under 
the Sixteenth Amendment.22 But there have been cases which have 
held to the contrary in certain types of situations. 
In Tourtelot 11. Commissioner23 and Wiegand 11. Commissioner,24 
the corporation had only class A and class B stock; the classes differing 
as to par value, voting power, and participation in dividend distribu-
tions and liquidation distributions. The corporation paid a 50 percent 
dividend in class A shares to holders of that class, and a 50 percent 
dividend in class B shares to holders of that class. The dividends had 
been declared as stock dividends. As a result of the stock dividend, the 
rights of each class of stock to dividend and liquidation distributions 
changed. The dividends were held non-taxable in the T ourtelot case, 
where a stockholder held an equal proportion of shares of each class 
of stock. In the Wiegand case, where the stockholders held either only 
one class of stock or a different percentage of each class, the dividends 
1s I.R.C. (1939), §ll5(f)(l); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189 
(1910). 
19 Ibid. 
20 I.R.C. (1954), §3O5(a). 
21 I.R.C. (1954), §3O5(b)(l). 
22Distributions of common on preferred: Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 56 
S.Ct. 767 (1936); distribution of preferred on preferred: Helms Bakeries, 46 B.T.A. 308 
(1942). 
2a (7th Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 167. 
24 (3d Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 479. 
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also were held non-taxable. The theory of these cases was that there 
was no change in the stockholders' strict legal rights, and thus their pro-
portional interest in the corporation remained the same. It may thus 
be seen that if a corporation, in distributing its stock or stock rights in 
discharge of preference dividends, does so in such a way as to bring 
the distribution within the rule of the T ourtelot and Wiegand cases, 
the distribution may well be held to be constitutionally exempt from 
taxation under section 305(b)(l) of the 1954 code. 
It should be noted, however, that if the stock distributed in dis-
charge of preference dividends is held to be non-taxable under section 
305 of the 1954 code, it well may be considered as section "306 stock" 
within the meaning of section 306(c) of the 1954 code.25 
Congress, in enacting section 306 of the new code, has attempted 
to deal with the problem of the "preferred stock bail-out." This prob-
lem was raised in Chamberlin v. Commissioner,26 in which the cor-
poration distributed a dividend in preferred stock to the common stock-
holders of the corporation. The dividend was issued pursuant to a plan 
whereby the shareholders would sell the preferred stock and report 
their gain upon the transaction at capital gain rates rather than receive 
a cash dividend and report it at ordinary income rates. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the dividend 
was not taxable. 
"A stock dividend, legally created and distributed, which is a 
dividend in substance as well as in form, does not change from a 
non-taxable dividend into a taxable one because of the purpose of 
its issuance or on account of the good or bad judgment of the 
directors in declaring it."27 
The court further stated that "A non-taxable stock dividend does not 
become a taxable cash dividend upon its sale by the recipient. On the 
contrary, it is the sale of a capital asset."28 
Section 306 of the 1954 code makes a Bank attack on this problem 
in that it provides, with certain exceptions, for the taxation at ordinary 
income rates, of the gain received by a shareholder upon the disposi-
tion by him of section "306 stock" as defined in section 306(c).29 The 
administration of this provision is certain to present many interpretative 
problems, the principal one being: what constitutes section "306 stock"? 
25 Treas. Reg. § 1.305· I. 
20 (6th Cir. 1953) 207 F. (2d) 462. 
21 Id. at 469. 
28Jbid. 
20 I.R.C. (1954), §306(a). 
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The 1954 code excludes from the definition of section "306 stock" 
that stock which may be classified as common stock,30 with the excep-
tion of " ... common stock with respect to which there is a privilege 
of converting into stock other than common stock (or into property), 
whether or not the conversion privilege is contained in such stock. ... "31 
One must deal, then, with the question: what constitutes "common 
stock" within the meaning of section 306(c) of the new code? 
It is apparent that the factor of corporate control was one of the 
principal reasons why tax conscious planners used preferred stock rather 
than common stock to extract earnings and profits from a corporation 
at capital gain rates. The issuance of preferred stock as a dividend would 
not change the control of the corporation, whereas the issuance of com-
mon stock as a dividend well might do so. The purpose behind the 
enactment of section 306 of the 1954 code was to prevent the use of the 
"preferred stock bail-out." Common stock may have been omitted from 
the statutory definition of section "306 stock" for the reason that the 
factor of corporate control would normally inhibit its use as a means 
of extracting earnings and profits from a corporation at capital gain rates. 
If the courts are to interpret section 306(c) in strict accord with the 
congressional intent, they might well state that only common stock 
possessed of voting rights (i.e., only common stock the issuance of 
which might affect corporate control) is within the exception set forth 
in section 306. 
On the other hand, the courts might hold that the exception set 
forth in section 306(c) encompasses all stock which, under state law, 
is characterized as common stock. The exception would then cover non-
voting as well as voting common stock, and there then might come into 
being a "non-voting common stock bail-out" which would accomplish 
the same purpose as the "preferred stock bail-out," and which would not 
in any way affect control of the corporation.32 
A third possible interpretation which the courts might give to the 
term "common stock" is that it includes that stock denominated, for 
example, by the corporation as "class A stock" or "class B stock," etc., 
which is nominally common stock, but which actually is preferred stock. 
If such an unfortunate interpretation is given to the phrase "common 
stock," it is clear that a corporation could issue a dividend in what is 
essentially preferred stock, without entailing the disadvantages accruing 
30 I.R.C. (1954), §306(c). 
31 I.R.C. (1954), §306(e)(2). 
32 I.R.C. (1954), §306(c)(l)(A) excludes from the definition of "§306 stock" com-
mon stock distributed on common stock. 
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under section 306 from the issuance of a dividend in preferred stock.33 
The Treasury Regulations promulgated under the 1954 code do 
not shed any light upon the meaning of the phrase "common stock" 
contained in section 306(c). 
Section 306(c)(l)(B) provides that section "306 stock" includes 
stock which is not common stock, which is not a stock dividend, and 
the receipt of which in a corporate distribution otherwise would be tax-
free, provided that " ... the effect of the transaction was substantially 
the same as the receipt of a stock dividend .... "34 It is apparent that 
the same interpretative difficulties will arise in connection with the 
phrase "substantially the same as the receipt of a stock dividend" as 
arose in connection with the phrase "essentially equivalent to the dis-
tribution of a taxable dividend," under section l 15(g) of the 1939 
code.35 The new question which will arise, however, is whether the 
word "substantially" will be interpreted to mean "essentially," or 
whether the word "substantially"· requires the application of a different 
standard, more favorable to the government. It should be noted that 
the word "substantially," like the word "reasonable," cannot be clarified 
to any great extent by legislative enactment. The standard of substan-
tiality, like the standard of reasonableness, must be left to the courts for 
interpretation. 36 
III. T axahility of the Corporation upon the Distribution _of 
Inventory Assets 
Section 311 of the new code is a provision which never before has 
appeared in the statute. However, subsection (a) thereof actually in-
corporates existing law upon the subject37 by providing that ". . . no 
gain or loss shall be recognized by a ~orporation on the distribution, 
33 Note in this connection the distributions in Tourtelot v. Commissioner, (7th Cir. 
1951) 189 F. (2d) 167 and Wiegand v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 479. 
34 I.R.C. (1954), §306(c)(l)(B). 
35 Under §115(g)(I) of I.R.C. (1939), some courts made the question turn upon 
whether the redemption was for an honest business purpose: Commissioner v. James, (2d 
Cir. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 707; Commissioner v. Quackenbos, (2d Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 156; 
Commissioner v. Cordingley, (1st Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 118; Commissioner v. Champion, 
(6th Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 513; Brown v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 73; 
Patty v. Helvering, (2d Cir. 1938) 98 F. (2d) 717. Other courts felt that it was the net 
effect of the distribution, not the motives and plans of the taxpayer, which was determina-
tive: Flanagan v. Helvering, (D.C. Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 937; Smith v. United States, 
(3d Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 692. 
36 The Treasury Regulations promulgated under the 1954 code do not shed any light 
upon this matter. 
37Treas. Reg. 118, §39.22(a)-15 (1953); General Utilities & Operating Co. v. 
Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 56 S.Ct. 185 (1935); Commissioner v. First State Bank of 
Stratford, (5th Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 1004. 
734 MmmGAN LAw Ravmw [ Vol. 53 
with respect to its stock, of (1) its stock (or rights to acquire its stock) 
or (2) property."38 Subsections (b) and (c) of section 311 provide 
exceptions to the general rule stated in section 31 l(a). Subsection (b) 
of section 311 deals with distributions of "inventory assets" as defined 
in section 3ll(b)(2)(A), providing that in certain cases the corpo-
ration shall realize a taxable gain upon such distributions at capital 
gairi rates. 39 
The principal interpretative problem arising in connection with 
section 311 of the new code is with reference to the phrase "inventory 
assets." Section 3ll(b)(2)(A) defines "inventory assets" to be " ... 
stock in trade of the corporation, or other property of a kind which 
would properly be included in the inventory of the corporation if on 
hand at the close of the taxable year." 
The first question which may arise is whether the definition of 
"inventory assets" in section 3ll(b)(2)(A) is to be interpreted in a 
vacuum, or in the light of other provisions of the code. The language 
used in section 31 l(b)(2)(A) is the same as that used in section 
1221(1) of the new code, formerly section 117(a)(l)(A) of the old 
code, and the courts may well hold, on the basis of identity of statutory 
language, that Congress intended section 3ll(b)(2)(A) of the new 
code to be interpreted as section ll 7(a)(l)(A) of the old code was 
interpreted. However, it should also be noted that section 312(b)(2) 
(A) of the new code defines "inventory assets" for purposes of section 
312, and that such definition includes not only "inventory assets" as 
defined in section 312(b)(2)(A),4° but also includes" ... (ii) property 
held by the corporation primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary 
course of its trade or business .... " 
It is clear from a reading of' sections 311 and 312 of the new code 
that Congress intended the term "inventory assets" to have different 
meanings in different contexts. It is not, however, clear whether Con-
gress intended the phrase "stock in trade of the corporation, or other 
property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory 
of the corporation if on hand at the close of the taxable year" to have 
different meanings in different contexts.41 If Congress intended the 
phrase to have a constant meaning throughout the code, then it does 
not encompass "property held by the corporation primarily for sale to 
38 I.R.C. (1954), §3ll(a). 
s0 I.R.C. (1954), §311(b)(l). 
40 I.R.C. (1954), §312(b)(2)(A)(i). 
41 The Treasury Regulations promulgated under the 1954 code shed no light upon this 
matter. 
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customers in the ordinary course of its trade or business." This inter-
pretation is supported by the fact that in several places in the code, 
Congress has drawn a distinction between "stock in trade of the cor-
poration, or other property of a kind which would properly be included 
in the inventory of the corporation if on hand at the close of the taxable 
year," and "property held by the corporation primarily for sale to cus-
tomers in the ordinary course of its trade or business."42 It could be said, 
however, that since Congress failed to draw this distinction in section 
3II(b)(2)(A), it did not intend the former phrase to have a constant 
meaning throughout the code. In such case, "inventory assets," for 
purposes of section 3ll of the 1954 code, might be said to include 
"property held by the corporation primarily for sale to customers in the 
ordinary course of its trade or business." 
Conclusion 
As pointed out above, the major interpretative difficulties existing 
under the 1939 code which Congress failed to resolve through its en-
actment of the 1954 code are (I) the meaning of the phrase "reasonable 
needs of the business" with reference to the accumulated earnings tax; 
and (2) the taxability of stock dividends as income to the distributee. 
It would seem that the problem of "reasonable needs of the business" 
is incapable of clarification through legislative enactment because of 
the amorphous quality of the word "reasonable." The problem in re-
gard to the taxability of stock dividends distributed in discharge of pref-
erence dividends would be solved if the courts were to hold that the 
class A and class B stock of the type distributed in the T ourtelot and 
Wiegand cases are not common stock, but preferred stock. The Treas-
ury Regulations promulgated under the 1954 code provide that where 
stock which is not common stock is distributed in discharge of prefer-
ence dividends, and such distribution is held non-taxable under section 
305 of the 1954 code, such stock is to be considered as section "306 
stock," and the distributee will be taxed at ordinary income rates upon 
his disposition of such stock.43 
Insofar as the interpretative difficulties raised by the 1954 code are 
concerned, all but one may be resolved by legislative enactment. It 
would be relatively easy for Congress to clarify the meaning of "facts 
sufficient to show the basis thereof," as that phrase appears in connec-
42I.R.C. (1939), §l17(a)(l)(A), now I.R.C. (1954), §1221(1); I.R.C. (1954), 
§312(b)(2)(A). 
43 Treas. Reg. §1.306-3(a) and (c); Treas. Reg. §1.305-1. 
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tion with the problem of the burden of proof under the statutory provi-
sions taxing corporate accumulations. It would also be simple for Con-
gress to state what is meant by the term "common stock" as it appears 
in section 306(c) of the new code. Likewise, by an explanatory para-
graph, Congress can clearly delineate the meaning of the phrase "in-
ventory assets" as it appears in section 3ll(b)(2)(A). The interpre-
tative difficulties raised by the phrase "substantially the same as the 
receipt of a stock dividend," which appears in section 306(c)(l)(B) 
are not so easily solved. These difficulties may be resolved only through 
judicial interpretation. Such interpretation, however, will be aided by 
the large body of judicial interpretation which has grown up under 
section llS(g)(l) of the 1939 code, which contains substantially 
similar language. 
Alice Austin, S.Ed. 
